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Previous research has shown that it is possible to experimentally induce interpretive biases using
ambiguous scenarios. This study extends past findings by examining the effects of cognitive bias
modification for interpretation on subsequent scenario recall. Participants were trained to interpret
emotionally ambiguous passages in either a positive or negative direction. Transfer of the training to
novel scenarios was tested. After training, participants were also asked to recall details from these novel
scenarios. The results indicate that the training was effective in inducing the intended group differences
in interpretive bias. Importantly, participants exhibited memory biases that corresponded to their training
condition. These results suggest that manipulating interpretive biases can result in corresponding changes
in memory. Findings from this study highlight the importance of future research on the relation among
cognitive biases and on the possibility of modifying cognitive biases in emotional disorders.
Keywords: cognitive bias modification, training, interpretation, memory

thereby setting the stage for an increased vulnerability to emotional disorders (Joormann, Yoon, & Siemer, 2009). Indeed, cognitive theories of emotional disorders posit that depressed and
anxious individuals and people who are at risk for developing
these disorders exhibit cognitive biases in various aspects of information processing, including interpretation and memory
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). These theories further propose that
cognitive biases are not just an epiphenomenon of these disorders,
but instead play an important role in increasing the risk for the
onset, maintenance, and recurrence of disorders. Recent reviews
suggest, for example, that depressed people demonstrate increased
elaboration of negative material and a tendency to interpret ambiguous material in a mood-congruent manner (e.g., Mathews &
MacLeod, 2005). In addition, biased memory for negative, relative
to positive, information represents perhaps the most robust cognitive finding associated with major depression. In a meta-analysis
of studies assessing recall performance, Matt, Vasquez, and Campbell (1992) found that people with major depression remember
10% more negative words than positive words. Nondepressed
controls, in contrast, demonstrated a positive memory bias, in that
they recalled 8% more positive than negative words.
Given the importance of cognition for everyday emotion regulation and risk for emotional disorders, modifying cognitive biases
may change people’s reactivity to emotion-eliciting events and
may improve their ability to regulate negative affect. Furthermore,
research on how to alter these biases may provide important
insight into processes that underlie the onset and maintenance of
disorders and thus holds great promise for treatment and prevention efforts. Indeed, recent research has investigated the impact of
bias modification on various outcome measures including depression and anxiety symptoms, as well as responses to acute stressors.
Some of these studies have focused on manipulating attention by
guiding participants to attend to either threatening or emotionally

Cognition plays a critical role in human emotion. According to
cognitive theories of emotion, appraisals or interpretations of the
situation determine if an emotion is experienced and which emotion is experienced (Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Siemer, Mauss, &
Gross, 2007). Cognition, therefore, is also the primary route
through which emotions can be regulated. Cognitive reappraisal or
the reinterpretation of the emotion-eliciting situation, for example,
is a particularly effective emotion regulation strategy (Gross &
John, 2002). In addition, studies have shown that memory plays a
critical role in the regulation of negative affect. Investigators
studying the relation between mood and memory have proposed
that mood-incongruent recall can be a powerful mood and emotion
regulation strategy (Erber & Erber, 1994; Parrott & Sabini, 1990;
Rusting & DeHart, 2000) and that people actively retrieve pleasant
thoughts and memories in an attempt to regulate or reverse unpleasant moods (e.g., Josephson, Singer, & Salovey, 1996). Not
surprisingly, individual differences in mood-congruent memory
and in the accessibility of mood-incongruent material have been
proposed to predict the ability to regulate negative mood states
(Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007). In
addition, the tendency to recall positive events and forget negative
events is associated with higher levels of well-being over the
course of one’s life (Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003).
Consequently, cognitive biases in the initial processing of events
as well as in the memory for these events may affect emotion
experience and interfere with one’s ability to regulate affect,
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neutral stimuli (or to avoid threatening stimuli). Results show that
after attention training away from threat, participants reported
reduced negative affect to a standardized stress manipulation (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002) or
upon arrival at college abroad (See, MacLeod, & Bridle, 2009).
After the training of positive attentional biases, participants looked
less at negative images during a stress induction (Wadlinger &
Isaacowitz, 2008). As outlined previously, however, interpretation
and memory biases have particularly detrimental effects on the
ability to regulate negative mood states and may increase risk for
the onset and maintenance of debilitating emotional disorders.
Using emotionally ambiguous homographs, Gray and Mathews
(2000) demonstrated that interpretive biases can be induced, and
that participants are often not aware of this modification. In a
related study, Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) used ambiguous
scenarios to train individuals to make either nonanxious or anxious
interpretations of subsequent ambiguous situations. In addition,
participants who were trained to interpret ambiguity in a nonthreatening manner had an attenuated anxiety reaction to a subsequent
video stressor (Wilson, MacLeod, Mathews, & Rutherford, 2006;
see also Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, Ridgeway, & Cook, 2006).
Finally, training positive biases using imagery helped to alleviate
a subsequently induced negative mood state in a nonclinical sample (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009). Importantly, effects of interpretive training on anxiety have been shown to remain stable after
a 24-hr delay between training and test (Yiend, Mackintosh, &
Mathews, 2005).
Modifying interpretation biases may not only hold great promise
because it affects the interpretation of novel scenarios and responses to stressors, but changes in interpretation may also affect
memory. Hirsch, Clark, and Mathews (2006) recently pointed out
that cognitive biases do not operate in isolation but rather influence
and interact with one another. Moreover, evidence from reconstructive memory research indicates that the way in which events
are interpreted determines how they are remembered (Bartlett,
1932). If individuals tend to interpret situations in a negative
manner, they may also be more likely to remember them in a way
that reflects this initial interpretation. Memory biases may therefore be linked to initial biases in interpretation (Hertel, 2004),
although very few studies have empirically investigated this possibility. Among the few is a recent study by Hertel, Brozovich,
Joormann, and Gotlib (2008) who examined the connection between interpretation and memory in individuals diagnosed with
social phobia. When asked to recall details from previously presented ambiguous scenarios, socially anxious compared to nonanxious participants tended to produce more distortions that reflected their initial negative interpretations of the scenarios. This
result suggests that memory biases can be produced by biased
interpretations and that modifying the initial interpretation of
events could prevent subsequent biases in memory.
The present study was designed to investigate whether
interpretation-bias training not only affects the interpretation of
novel scenarios, but also participants’ reconstructive memory for
these scenarios. Modifying memory may, in turn, affect mood,
emotional vulnerability, and future interpretations crucial to the
development and maintenance of emotional disorders. Evidence
for the causal role of interpretation bias in memory distortion could
also provide possible directions for clinical interventions. To investigate the effect of cognitive bias modification of interpretation

(CBM-I), we randomly assigned participants to a positive or negative interpretation training group using ambiguous social scenarios and assessed the transfer of this training on the subsequent
interpretation of novel ambiguous scenarios. The intention of the
training was not to target depression- or anxiety-specific emotions,
but instead to train participants to interpret material in a generally
positive or negative light. Specifically, we predicted that participants’ response latencies to training-congruent and -incongruent
interpretations of ambiguous scenarios should reflect their training
condition. Thus, as training progresses participants in the positive
compared to the negative training group should be faster to respond to sentences that describe positive interpretations. In addition, we predicted that training would transfer to the novel scenarios presented after training completion and would affect whether
positive or negative interpretations of these scenarios will be
judged as being more or less similar to the novel scenarios. Thus,
participants in the positive compared to the negative training
group, should judge positive interpretations as more similar to the
ambiguous scenarios. Importantly, to investigate the relation between interpretation and memory biases, we also asked participants to recall these novel scenarios, guided by the hypothesis that
interpretation training not only changes participants’ interpretations of novel scenarios, but also induces a matching memory bias.
We predicted that the interpretation training leads to a trainingcongruent memory bias for the ambiguous scenarios such that
participants will be more likely to report memory distortions (or
intrusions) that are congruent with their training condition. Finally,
we assessed mood before and after training and after recall, mainly
for the purpose of ascertaining whether changes in interpretation
and recall might have been caused by changes in mood instead of
by CBM-I.

Method
Participants
Fifty-eight undergraduate college students (male: 30/ female:
28) were recruited to participate in the study in exchange for
course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to either the
positive or negative training condition.

Questionnaires
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II). Severity of current
depressive symptoms was assessed using this 21-item self-report
measure. The BDI is a widely used depression scale with good
psychometric properties (Beck & Steer, 1993; Beck, Steer, &
Garbin, 1988), and correlations with clinician ratings of depression
from .62 to .66 (Foa, Riggs, Dancu, & Rothbaum, 1993).
Mood ratings.
To assess current mood participants were
presented with multiple mood items (disappointed, angry, sad,
upset, discouraged, fearful, helpless, disgust, frustrated, and insecure) and asked to indicate the degree to which they felt this way
right now, on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 11 (extremely). Responses
were averaged across all items to yield a single negative mood
score (␣ ⫽ .85).

Interpretation Training
Participants were presented with 10 blocks of 13 scenarios each
in which they were asked to imagine themselves as the central
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character. In a scenario titled “Meeting a Friend,” for example,
participants were asked to picture themselves waiting at an empty
bar to meet an old friend. Instructions and scenarios were taken
from training studies by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000). Each
scenario consisted of a title and two to three sentences and ended
with a word fragment for participants to complete. Within each of
the 10 training blocks, 8 training scenarios, 2 probe scenarios, and
3 filler scenarios were presented. For the training scenarios, each
word fragment could be completed to produce only one possible
solution, which disambiguated the meaning of the scenario according to the assigned training condition. Thus, for the positive
training group, the completed fragment produced a positive outcome for the scenario, whereas for the negative training group the
completed fragment produced a negative outcome. In probe scenarios, the word fragment disambiguated the sentence in the same
way (either positive or negative) for all participants, regardless of
training group. In filler scenarios, completion of the word fragments produced a neutral meaning. Examples can be found in
previous training studies (e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).
Before training, participants were told that for each trial, they
would be shown a brief scenario ending with an incomplete word
fragment. They were instructed to press the spacebar as soon as
they were able to solve the word fragment. The latency of this key
press was recorded. Following the key press, the scenario disappeared from the screen and participants then typed the completed
word on the next screen. In the final segment of the trial, participants were presented with a simple comprehension question and
responded by using “Y” (yes) or “N” (no). This comprehension
question served to emphasize the valence of each scenario, as well
as test participants’ understanding of the text. Participants were
given the opportunity to complete three practice trials before
beginning the training to ensure their understanding of the task.
The order of the training blocks and the order of the scenarios
within the blocks were newly randomized for each participant.

Test Phase
In the test phase, participants were presented with 20 novel
ambiguous scenarios, identical in structure to the ones they had
viewed in the training phase. The main difference between the
training and test scenarios was the fact that, although there was
only one possible solution for the word fragment, the resolved
word maintained the ambiguity of the preceding text and did not
resolve the scenario in a positive or negative way. The scenarios
were presented in random order. Again, participants were shown
each scenario on the computer screen and were instructed to press
any key as soon as they were able to solve the word fragment.
After doing so, the scenario disappeared from the screen and they
were asked to enter the completed word. Next, to maintain consistency, participants were presented with a comprehension question and were asked to indicate their answers with a “Y” or “N”
response. Following their response, they were presented with the
next test scenario. Unlike the comprehension questions during the
training phase, these questions did not draw attention to the emotional implications of the scenario.
Interpretation test. Following a brief filler task, participants
completed a computer task in which they were presented with the
titles of the previously presented test scenarios. Each title was
presented one at a time on the screen in random order. For each
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scenario title, participants were instructed to rate four sentences
according to their similarity to the original scenario with the
corresponding title (1, very different; 2, fairly different; 3, fairly
similar; 4, very similar). In each case, two of these sentences were
target sentences–a positive target that matched a positive interpretation of the original scenario (e.g., You arrange to meet in a bar
and your friend arrives late) and a negative target that matched a
negative interpretation (e.g., You arrange to meet in a bar but your
friend doesn’t turn up). The other two sentences were positive and
negative foils, which were sentences with a generally positive or
negative meaning that was unrelated to the ambiguous concept in
the original scenario. These foil statements were included to assess
broader valence effects of the training. The positive foil sentence
assigned a generally positive meaning to the scenario, but was not
based on any information provided by the original text (e.g., Your
friend wants to meet again but you don’t have time), while the
negative foil sentence assigned a generally negative meaning but
was not based on the original text (e.g., Your friend tells you that
she does not want to meet you).
To assess interpretations of the test scenarios, each of the four
sentences (per scenario) was presented one at a time under the
scenario title. When each sentence appeared on the screen, participants were instructed to type the number corresponding to their
rating of similarity to the meaning of the scenario. Once they
entered their similarity rating, they were presented with the next
sentence until they had provided ratings for all four sentences
corresponding to that scenario title. The order of these sentences
was newly randomized for each participant.
Recall task. Finally, participants were asked to recall details
from the 20 test scenarios. The titles of the scenarios were presented in random order on the computer screen. When presented
with each title, participants were instructed to recall aloud as many
details as they could from the corresponding scenario. A key press
initiated the next trial. Responses were audio-taped and later
transcribed. Two independent raters were trained to code the
transcriptions for whether each recalled scenario contained intrusions, or new ideas (yes/no), and if so, the valence of each
intrusion (positive, negative, neutral). Once adequate levels of
interrater agreement in the number and valence of intrusions were
achieved (r ⫽ .85) using independent training scenarios, two raters
who were blind to the experimental conditions categorized intrusions in each recalled scenario as belonging to one of three groups:
negative (e.g., everyone stares and laughs at you at the bar),
positive (e.g., your friend arrives right as you walk in the door and
is happy to see you), or neutral (e.g., you have a seat and wait at
the bar).

Overall Procedure
At the beginning of the session, participants were informed that
they were participating in a study examining concentration and
memory. Participants were assigned to complete either the positive
or negative interpretation training on the computer, which lasted
approximately 45 min. After the training phase, participants completed a 15-min word scramble filler task that was followed by the
test phase. During the test phase, participants first read the set of
20 emotionally ambiguous scenarios and then completed another
brief filler task, the Reverse Digit Span task from the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III) before performing the
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interpretation and recall tests, in that order. Mood ratings were
collected before the training, right after the training and at the end
of the recall task. The BDI-II was administered at the end of the
session, which lasted ⬃1.5 hr.

Results
Demographic Characteristics and Mood Ratings
Two participants failed to complete the BDI-II. Participants in
the two groups did not differ in gender (positive group: 15F, 14M;
negative group: 13F, 16M). The positive (M ⫽ 8.9, SD ⫽ 7.9) and
negative (M ⫽ 9.1, SD ⫽ 7.7) training groups also did not differ
in BDI scores, t(54) ⬍ 1. We compared mood ratings at three
time-points: before the interpretation training (Time 1), after the
interpretation training (Time 2), and after the recall task (Time 3),
using a mixed-design ANOVA with training condition (positive
vs. negative) as the between-subjects factor and time as the withinsubjects factor. No significant effects were observed for group,
F(1, 56) ⫽ 2.18, p ⬎ .10, time, F(2, 112) ⬍ 1, or time ⫻ group,
F(2, 112) ⬍ 1.1

Interpretation Training
Two sets of analyses were performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the interpretation training. First, we calculated the total
time to read each probe scenario and respond to the word fragment
at the end during the training phase. During the second half of
training, we expected to see that training groups would differ in
their latencies for positive and negative probe scenarios in that the
positive compared to the negative training group would respond
faster to positive probe scenarios and the negative compared to the
positive training group would respond faster to negative probe
scenarios. Second, similarity ratings of the novel test scenarios
were examined. We predicted higher similarity ratings for target
statements corresponding to training condition, such that participants in the positive group compared to the negative group would
rate positive target sentences as being more similar to the novel
scenarios and participants in the negative group compared to the
positive group would rate negative target sentences as being more
similar to the novel scenarios. Effects that are not described in the
results sections were nonsignificant with p values greater than .05.
Significant effects qualified by significant higher order effects are
not reported.
Probe response times. Reading and response times to the
positive and negative probe scenarios were averaged for each half
of the training. After accounting for outliers that exceeded the
quartiles by more than three times the interquartile range, 0.2% of
responses were eliminated. Mean latencies were entered into a
mixed-model ANOVA with training group (positive vs. negative)
as the between-subjects factor and probe valence (positive vs.
negative) and time (first vs. second half) as within-subjects factors.
The analysis yielded a significant three-way interaction among
valence, time, and group, F(1, 56) ⫽ 4.01, p ⬍ .05, 2 ⫽ .07.
Mean response times are presented in Table 1.
To examine whether these interactions supported the effectiveness of our training, we conducted follow-up tests for response
times in the second half of the training. First, we examined
whether response times to positive and negative probe scenarios

Figure 1. Mean similarity ratings for positive and negative target and foil
statements when rating novel test scenarios separated by training group.
Similarity ratings ranged from 1(very different) to 4 (very similar). Postarget ⫽ positive target, neg-target ⫽ negative target, pos-foil ⫽ positive
foil, and neg-foil ⫽ negative foil. Error bars represent 1 SE.

differed within training groups within the second half of the
training trials. These analyses revealed no significant difference
for the negative training group, t(28) ⬍ 1. The positive training
group, however, exhibited a significant difference, t(28) ⫽ 4.11,
p ⬍ .001. Individuals trained to make positive interpretations
responded faster to positive compared to negative probes, illustrating the expected effect of interpretation training for the positive
group.
Next, we examined whether we obtained significant differences
between groups in their responses to positive or negative probes
during the second half of training. There were no differences in
response latencies to positive probes between the positive and
negative training groups, t(56) ⬍ 1. The negative training group,
however, was significantly faster to respond to negative probes,
compared to the positive training group, t(56) ⫽ 2.09, p ⬍ .05.
Similarity ratings for test scenarios. To examine the effect
of training on participants’ interpretations of novel scenarios,
similarity ratings for the test scenarios were entered into a mixedmodel ANOVA with group (positive vs. negative training) as the
between-subjects factor and valence of the statements (positive vs.
negative) and type of statement (target vs. foil) as within-subjects
factors. Analyses revealed the predicted three-way interaction of
group, valence, and type, F(1, 56) ⫽ 17.47, p ⬍ .001, 2 ⫽ .24.
Follow-up analyses examining this three-way interaction were
conducted separately for foil and target statements. Results of the
follow-up tests revealed no significant training group differences
in similarity ratings for both positive foils, t(56) ⫽ 1.34, p ⬎ .10,
and negative foils, t(56) ⬍ 1. There were, however, significant
between-groups differences for the target statements. As seen in
Figure 1, participants in the positive training group chose higher
similarity ratings for positive target statements than participants in
the negative training group, t(56) ⫽ 3.75, p ⬍ .001. Additionally,
participants in the negative training group compared to participants
1

No significant correlations were found among mood ratings assessed
after the training and any of the interpretation or memory measures (i.e.,
similarity ratings for positive and negative targets and positive, negative,
and neutral intrusions).
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Table 1
Mean Latencies (in seconds) to Read and Respond to Probe Scenarios in the Training Phase
First half

Positive probe
Negative probe
Note.

Second half

Positive group
M (SD)

Negative group
M (SD)

Positive group
M (SD)

Negative group
M (SD)

14.68 (4.18)
16.27 (3.87)

15.51 (4.40)
16.13 (3.88)

15.07 (3.64)
18.32 (4.94)

16.19 (4.77)
15.50 (5.34)

N ⫽ 58.

in the positive training group chose higher similarity ratings for
negative target statements, t(56) ⫽ 4.34, p ⬍ .001. In summary,
participants endorsed higher similarity ratings for target statements
corresponding to their training condition.

Recall Task
The main goal of our study was to examine whether interpretation training affects participants’ memory for the test scenarios.
Thus, our main prediction was that the interpretation training
would result in a corresponding memory bias in the free-recall
task. We assessed the number and valence of memory distortions
or intrusions (i.e., new details that the participants “recalled” that
had never been part of the original scenarios). The training groups
were compared on number of intrusions using a mixed-model
ANOVA with training condition (positive vs. negative) as the
between-subjects factor and valence of the intrusion (positive vs.
negative vs. neutral) as the within-subjects factor. The results
supported the predicted significant interaction between training
group and intrusion valence, F(2, 112) ⫽ 5.60, p ⬍ .01, 2 ⫽ .09.
Although the groups did not differ in the number of reported
neutral intrusions, t(56) ⬍ 1, there were significant group differences in both the number of positive intrusions, t(56) ⫽ 4.60, p ⬍
.001, and negative intrusions, t(56) ⫽ 2.57, p ⬍ .01. As illustrated
in Figure 2, both groups produced significantly more neutral than
positive intrusions [positive group: t(28) ⫽ 3.41, p ⬍ .01; negative
group: t(28) ⫽ 11.10, p ⬍ .001]. Both groups also produced
significantly more neutral intrusions than negative intrusions [positive group: t(28) ⫽ 9.11, p ⬍ .001; negative group: t(28) ⫽ 6.19,
p ⬍ .001]. Most notably, the positive group “recalled” more
positive intrusions than the negative group, t(28) ⫽ 3.41, p ⬍ .01,
while the negative group “recalled” more negative intrusions than
the positive group, t(28) ⫽ 3.71, p ⬍ .01. These results indicate
that participants in each group reported more memory intrusions
corresponding to the valence of their trained condition, suggesting
that memory distortions result from interpretation biases.2

Discussion
These results support the proposition that biases in interpretation
can be induced, and that induced interpretation biases result in
corresponding biases in memory. Participants in the positive and
negative training groups demonstrated memory biases in the final
recall task that corresponded to their training condition. More
specifically, when asked to recall details from novel, ambiguous
scenarios, participants in each training group reported more intrusions (never-presented details) that corresponded to the valence of

their initial interpretation training. Thus, participants in the positive training group compared to the negative training group were
more likely to recall never-presented positive details whereas
participants in the negative training group compared to the positive
training group were more likely to recall never-presented negative
details.
Findings from the current study replicate past research demonstrating effects of CBM-I (e.g., Mackintosh et al., 2006; Mathews
& Mackintosh, 2000; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007;
Yiend et al., 2005). These results include group differences in
response latencies during interpretation training and in similarity
ratings of statements expressing interpretations of the novel scenarios. CBM-I studies, however, have focused only on one cognitive bias at a time, even though researchers have suggested that
cognitive biases likely interact and influence each other (e.g.,
Hirsch et al., 2006). Our recall results are in accordance with the
tradition of research on constructive memory, which demonstrates
that how events are initially interpreted affects how they are
subsequently recalled. Importantly, our findings extend those of
Hertel et al. (2008), who examined the relation between interpretation and memory biases in generalized social phobia (GSP).
Hertel et al. demonstrated that intrusions during recall reflected the
content of socially anxious interpretations of ambiguous scenarios,
whereas we showed that the valence of such intrusions was consistent with the valence of CBM-I training. Given the evidence for
memory biases in depression (Matt et al., 1992; Watkins,
Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992), the increasing evidence for
memory bias in anxiety when interpretation is taken into account
(e.g., Hertel et al., 2008; Lundt & Ost, 1996), and the potential
benefits from training positive biases on emotion regulation and
stress reactivity, investigating the connection between interpretation and memory is a critical area for further exploration. The
tendency to respond to negative events and mood states with
rumination, for example, is an important risk factor for the onset of
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008).
People who ruminate repetitively think about past events and
frequently start interpreting these events in a negative way. Indeed,
rumination has been shown to strengthen mood-congruent memory
2
Significant correlations among number of intrusions and similarity
ratings for target statements for all participants are as follows: positive
intrusions and positive targets, r(58) ⫽ .29, p ⬍ .05; positive intrusions and
negative targets, r(58) ⫽ ⫺.35, p ⬍ .01; negative intrusions and negative
targets, r(58) ⫽ .42, p ⬍ .001. There were no significant correlations
among intrusions and similarity ratings for target statements when examining each training group separately.
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Figure 2. Mean number of positive, negative, and neutral memory intrusions (i.e., material that was not
originally presented) made by each training group during the recall task. Error bars represent 1 SE.

biases (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). In
contrast, the benefits of reappraisal as a more adaptive emotion
regulation strategy may lie in its resemblance to positive interpretation training. Our findings suggest that the habitual use of rumination or reappraisal may have important consequences not only
for acute emotional responding but also for how the emotioneliciting event will be remembered and thereby affect emotional
well-being in the future.
The present study is the first to find CBM-I effects on subsequent scenario recall, but it is not the first to investigate effects on
tests of memory. Almost all previous CBM-I studies performed
with scenarios assessed the training effects on interpretation by
presenting “recognition” tests following the set of transfer scenarios. On these tests, as in the present procedure, participants rate the
similarity of alternatives presenting possible interpretations to the
content of the transfer scenarios. In effect, the participants are
“recognizing” the meaning of the scenarios, because they must
think back to the scenario to make the judgment. Our recall
procedure extends this effect to a more active, reconstructive task
of recalling the scenario as it was initially presented. Clearly,
participants might have been assisted in wording their recall by
having read the previous statements during the recognition test.
However, it is important to realize that all participants read statements expressing each type of interpretation, so if the assistance
occurred, it did not confound the effect.
The second investigation of CBM-I effects on scenario recall
was recently conducted by Salemink, Hertel, and Mackintosh
(2010), who trained biases after the reading of the scenarios to be
recalled in an effort to discover whether the recall of prior events
could be modified by later acquired biases. This effort produced
evidence of biased recall of the participants own interpretation of
the scenarios, but not the scenarios themselves. The lack of effect
on scenario recall was predicted on the basis that recall intrusions
arise from imagery processes operating during initial interpretations (see Hertel et al., 2008, Experiment 2; Hirsch et al., 2006).

Though prior training studies have obtained effects of training
for both positive and negative training groups (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Salemink et al., 2007; Yiend et al., 2005), some of
our measures (i.e., response latencies) indicate that the positive
training may have had stronger effects than the negative training.
We note, however, that our response times for fragment completion on probe trials included the reading time for the scenario,
unlike most training studies. Thus, the response times reported in
this study cannot be readily compared to previous training studies
and may be less sensitive. Even so, the negative training group
compared to the positive training group was faster to respond to
negative probes, and the positive training group was faster to
respond to positive compared to negative probes. In addition, the
finding that both training groups exhibited the expected trainingcongruent pattern in their similarity ratings supports the proposition that both training conditions were indeed effective.
Similar to other studies (e.g., Mackintosh et al., 2006, Experiment 1), we did not find congruent effects of training on anxiety,
suggesting that the training itself may not have direct effects on
mood/anxiety. However, our primary motivation for assessing
mood before and after training and after recall was to assess if
changes in interpretation and recall were a result of mood instead
of the interpretation training itself. More research exploring the
causal relationship between interpretive biases and mood is needed
to better explore the effects of the training on affect. Some recent
research has shown CBM-I effects on reactivity to a subsequent
stressor (see MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009).
We should point out limitations of this study. All of our participants received some form of training and we did not include a
no-training control group. It is therefore difficult to conclude
whether the obtained group differences in memory intrusions are
because of changes induced by the negative or the positive training
or both. However, the between-groups differences in the valence
of memory biases suggest that both training conditions were effective. In addition, we did not assess pretraining biases in inter-
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pretation or memory. However, the lack of significant group
differences in responses to probes in the first half of the training
(and in BDI scores) is reassuring in this regard.
Alternative explanations of our results point to mood and the
order of our tasks. First, the majority of research on memory bias
attributes changes to mood, so mood might possibly be responsible
for the changes in this experiment. Clearly, this account does not
apply, because measures of mood did not change as a consequence
of training and were not related to measures of memory. Second,
our method included an assessment of interpretation bias before
recall bias, so perhaps that assessment itself played a causal role.
The interpretation task was included so that we could assess
replication of previous findings (e.g., Grey & Mathews, 2000;
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Yiend et al., 2005). If we had
measured recall first, several problems would have presented
themselves. During recall, participants are given more time to
elaborate on their memory of the previously presented scenarios;
therefore, their subsequent similarity ratings would primarily assess how participants recalled the descriptions during recall, rather
than how they interpreted the situation initially. In the current
design, however, the interpretation task is presented as a brief
exercise in which participants are asked to quickly indicate similarity ratings, and less time for elaboration is allowed. In addition,
both groups are exposed to the same four sentences (2 targets and
2 foils); hence, group differences in recall cannot be explained by
differences in exposure to statements in the interpretation task. The
main constraint that test order offers these results pertains to
external validity. It is perhaps the case that explicit interpretation
is necessary to obtain biases in distorted remembering. This possibility deserves investigation in future research. Additionally, it is
possible that other presented information during the similarity
ratings task may have been incorporated into participants’ memory
for the original scenario, thus affecting results of the recall and
appearing as “new” information. However, all participants, regardless of training group, were presented with the same set of four
sentences during the similarity rating task. Thus, our training
group differences in intrusions in the recall task cannot be fully
explained by having participated in the earlier recognition task.
While some studies have begun to examine the effects of retraining on preexisting biases (Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook, &
Yiend, 2007; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2009) and in
clinical samples (Beard & Amir, 2008), it is important to continue
to examine the efficacy of cognitive bias modification in these
populations and to determine whether the effects can extend to
recall. In a similar vein, future studies should examine the impact
of manipulating interpretation and memory biases on mood and
emotional vulnerability, using both self-report and behavioral measures. Ultimately, more research on the durability of the effects of
the training, both on cognitive biases, as well as on mood symptoms, would provide important additional information regarding
the utility of the training in clinical settings for both the prevention
and treatment of emotional disorders. Furthermore, as suggested
by MacLeod et al., (2009), more research is needed to better
understand the mechanisms that drive the modification of biases in
cognition.
Interpretation and memory biases affect emotion regulation in
various ways. They can influence judgments of the frequency of
positive and negative events and of the likelihood that these types
of events occur in the future. Memory biases have also been

151

associated with lowered self-esteem, and increased levels of negative affect and hopelessness (MacLeod & Campbell, 1992). Increased accessibility of negative material and difficulties recalling
mood-incongruent material may interfere with the use of effective
mood regulation strategies. These difficulties in effectively managing negative mood may be an important mechanism by which
memory biases affect the maintenance and recurrence of depressive episodes (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson, 1999; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998). Increased accessibility and recall of positive material, on the other hand, is related to
higher levels of well-being (Charles et al., 2003). Manipulating
biases in memory and interpretation may, thus, affect mood and
emotional vulnerability following stressful experiences, potentially reducing the risk for onset and recurrence of emotional
disorders. Future studies are needed to extend these findings to
clinical populations and to examine the durability of the training
effects. Given the critical role of memory biases in the development and maintenance of emotional disorders, the ability to manipulate interpretation biases thereby changing memory for events
could hold great promise for the prevention and treatment of these
disorders and provide more insight into the functional role of
cognitive biases in emotional disorders.
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